VoIP vulnerabilities

Forbes has an interview with Philip Zimmermann, the founder of ZRTP the VoIP encryption software available for free. In it,  Zimmermann mentions why there is a need to encrypt VoIP more than with traditional telephony:

The traditional public telephone system that we’ve been using for the last hundred years is fairly well protected. It’s easy for the government to wiretap it by going to the phone company, but not easy for anyone else to wiretap it. If anyone else wanted to wiretap someone’s conversations, they’d have to find a place close to his or her office, get some alligator clips, and try to find the right wire out of thousands to clip them onto, and hope that nobody spots you doing it.

With traditional telephony, our threat model was mostly government wiretapping. With VoIP, anyone can wiretap us: the Russian mafia, foreign governments, hackers, disgruntled former employees. Anyone.

Historically, there’s been an asymmetry between government wiretapping and everyone else wiretapping that’s been in the government’s favor. As we migrate to VoIP, that differential collapses. The government itself is just as vulnerable. Wiretappers can reveal details of ongoing investigations, names and personal details of informants, conversations between officials and their wives about what time they pick up their kids at school.

Everyone thinks that VoIP is the future of telephony. It’s cheaper, more versatile, more feature-rich. So technological pressure herds us towards VoIP; we’ll have to encrypt it. Wiretapping will become so easy that the criminals–not just governments–will be able to do it routinely. There will be insider trading, blackmail, organized crime spying on judges and prosecutors, key witnesses killed before they can testify.

On his ZRTP and Zfone:

ZRTP is a protocol that defines how VoIP phones talk to each other in an encrypted way. Zfone is a program that we’ve developed for end users that employs ZTRP. They both use strong cryptographic algorithms to negotiate cryptographic keys between two parties without the participation of any phone company… They’re automatically created at the start of the call, and destroyed at the end. Only the two parties know the keys, and the phone company isn’t in a position where it can give the keys to a third party.

On why law enforcement agencies can still be doing their job:

From the point of view of law enforcement, traffic analysis can be quite useful. But for a criminal trying to get information for insider training, he’s only interested in the content. So encryption actually hits criminals harder than it hits law enforcement agencies.

Homomorphic Encryption

Even though I came across homomorphic function while studying discrete mathemtical structures in undergrad, I only had a vague idea what application it had. An IBM fellow has found an encryption mechanism that is homomorphic. That is, if the encryption function is f(), then it is homomorphic on operation + then

f(a+b) = f(a) + f(b)

This means that if a is encrypted and b is also encrypted (with function f), then to add them, there is no need to decrypt a and b, to add them. You can operate on the encrypted versions themselves. Why? Because f is homomorphic.

This has profound implications on its applications. If everything is seen as operation on data, then one need not really know what the data is, but can still operate on the data by working on their encrypted versions.

When more of the computing is moving to cloud, data privacy needs to be assured for (see, for example, how Facebook tried to take ownership, but failed). Homomorphic encryption is a technical solution to the problem, as opposed to policy based solution (licenses, MoUs etc.)

This is just theory so far. Not all operations can be made homomorphic for example. Research has to be done along this dimension to find ways to make all operations homomorphic. This seems to be going to take long time as the article mentions that it will take at least a decade to get it done. 10 years is too much a time in this modern world to bet on a technology for long time. Who knows what ‘s in store for future?

Moreover, the functions may not be purely homomorphic. After some operations, the original data may be corrupted (who knows whether is function is purely homomorphic until it is proven?). The solution proposed by the inventor is to double encrypt the data and periodically re-encrypt the inner encryption layer by decrypting it.

What about the key management problems?

The Vulnerable Password Recovery Schemes

Dare Obasanjo has a eye opening post in his blog about how Sarah Palin’s email account is hacked. The hacker who hacked her account had, apparently, used common sense (and Google of course) to crack it.

This is a serious security issue:

The fundamental flaw of pretty much every password recovery feature I’ve found online is that what they consider “secret” information actually isn’t thanks to social networking, blogs and even Wikipedia. Yahoo! Mail password recovery relies on asking you your date of birth, zip code and country of residence as a proof of identity. Considering that this is the kind of information that is on the average Facebook profile or MySpace page, it seems ludicrous that this is all that stops someone from stealing your identity online.

Even the sites that try to be secure by asking more personal questions such as “the name of your childhood pet” or “where you met your spouse” fail because people often write about their childhood pets and tell stories about how they met on weddings sites all over the Web.

Either keep your mouth shut on the Internet or use better secret questions/answers. :-)

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